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Plaintiff-Appellants ESTATE OF FRANCISCO SISON, JOSE, MARIA SISON, 
and JAIME PIOPONGO, through her undersigned attorney, hereby submit their opening brief in 
this appeal. 
I. CONCISE STATEMENT OF THE CASE. 
Appellants are victims of jus cogens hun1an rights violations who received federal 
judgments against the Estate of Ferdinand E. Marcos in 1995. They contend that their judgments 
were not "rendered~' within the meaning ofH.R.S. § 657-5 until all appeals were final and their 
mnended judgments were entered in the district court in 1997. Unless their judgn1ents are 
extended another 1 ° years -- as they have requested the federal court - the judglnents will lapse 
and they will be unable to execute thereon. Appellants, therefore, request this Honorable Court 
to answer the Certified Question by stating that under H.R.S. § 657-5 an appealed judgment is 
not rendered until all appeals are final or the time for appeal has expired. 
At the conclusion of an historic trifurcated trial spanning 3 years, a federal jury in 
Hawai'i found the Estate of Ferdinand E. Marcos liable for massive human rights abuses, 
including torture, summary execution and disappearance, committed against Filipinos during the 
Marcos dictatorship in the Philippines. The district COUlt possessed subject matter jurisdiction of 
the litigation pursuant to the Alien Tort Statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1350. Among the individual 
plaintiffs receiving compensatory damage awards were Jaime Piopongco ($175,000) and the 
Estate of Ferdinand Sison ($400,000). Piopongco's claim for loss of property was disallowed by 
the district court, and the claim of Jose Maria Sison for compensatory damages was denied by 
the district court for insufficient evidence. Following a defense motion for new trial or 
remittitur, judgments were entered for Piopongco and the Estate of Ferdinand Sison on August 
11, 1995 for $75,000 and $100,000 together with pro rata shares of a $1.2 billion award for 
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exelnplary damages and permanent injunctive relief. Final judgment in all cases in the 
consolidated multi-district litigation was entered by the Clerk of Court on December 6, 1995 
pursuant to Rule 58 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See United Stales v. lndrelunas, 
411 U.S. 216(1973). 
Piopongco appealed the denial of his clailn for loss of property to the Ninth 
Circuit Court of Appeals, and Sison appealed his denial of damages. The Ninth Circuit reversed 
the district cowt's rulings, HUao v. Estate of Ferdinand Marcos, 103 F.3d 789 (9th Cir. 1996), 
which resulted in the entry of an anlended final judgment for Piopongco and Sison on October 3, 
1997. Piopongco's total amended judgment is for $507,027.72. Sison's total amended judgment 
is for $882,027.72. 
On October 2, 2007 - one day short of 10 years after entry of the amended judgment --
Piopongco, Sison and the Estate of Ferdinand Sison filed a motion in the district court to extend 
their judgments an additional 10 years pursuant to H.R.S. § 657-5 which provides in pertinent 
part: 
Unless an extension is granted, every judglnent and decree of any 
couli of the State shall be presumed to be paid and discharged at 
the expiration of ten years after the judgment or decree was 
rendered. No action shall be commenced after the expiration often 
years from the date a judgment or decree was rendered or 
extended. No extension of a judgment or decree shall be granted 
unless the extension is sought within ten years of the date the 
original judgnlent or decree was rendered. A court shall not extend 
any judgment or decree beyond twenty years from the date of the 
original judgment or decree. No extension shall be granted without 
notice and the filing of a non-hearing motion or a hearing Inotion 
to extend the life of the judgment or decree. 
-2-
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The district court held a hearing on the nlotion on September 12, 2008. 1 For reasons articulated 
by the district court at the hearing, the court entered an order certifying a question to the Hawai'i 
Supreme Court on September 26,2008. 
II. CONCISE STATEMENTS OF POINTS ON APPEAL. 
By Order entered October 16, 2008, this Court agreed to decide the following 
celtified question: 
With regard to the time period for executing a judgment in H.R.S. 
§ 657-5, does the time period begin after the appellate process is 
completed (because the appeal may provide relief in the form of 
damages not provided for in the original judgment and because the 
completion of the appellate process allows the judgment creditor to 
proceed without limitation to collect the judgment) , or, in the 
altel1lative, given that an amended judgment establishes the 
relationship between judglnent creditor and debtor, does an 
amendment or nlodification of the original judgment (including an 
amended judgment providing tor additional relief) start the time 
period anew? 
III. ST ANDARDS OF REVIEW. 
Statutory interpretation is "a question of law reviewable de novo." State v. Levi~ 
102 Hawai'i 282, 285, 75 P.3d 1173, 1176 (2003) (quoting State v. Arceo, 84 Hawai'i 1, 10, 928 
P2d 843, 852 (1996). This court's statutory construction is guided by established rules: 
First, the fundmnental starting point for statutory interpretation is 
the language of the statute itselt: Second, where the statutory 
language is plain and unambiguous, our sole duty is to give effect 
to its plain and obvious meaning. Third, implicit in the task of 
statutory construction is our foremost obligation to ascertain and 
give effect to the intention of the legislature, which is to be 
obtained primarily from the language contained in the statute 
itself. Fourth, when there is doubt, doubleness of meaning, or 
indistinctiveness or uncertainty of an expression used in a statute, 
an anlbiguity exists. 
1 The delay is attributable to an appeal pending in the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals in the 
class case as to whether H.R.S. § 657-5 applied to a federal jUdgment on a federal cause of 
action. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals ruled that it did apply on July 31, 2008. 
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Peterson v. Hawaii Elec. Light Co:. Inc., 85 Hawai'i 322, 327-28, 944 P.2d 1265, 1270-71 
(1997)(superseded on other grounds by H.R.S. § 269-15.5 (Supp.1999) (folmatting, brackets, 
citations, and quotation marks omitted). 
In the event of ambiguity in a statute, "the meaning of the ambiguous words may 
be sought by exatnining the context, with which the ambiguous words, phrases, and sentences 
ITIay be compared, in order to asce11ain their true meaning." ld. (quoting H.R.S. § 1-15(1) 
(1993»). Moreover, the courts l11ay resort to extrinsic aids in determining legislative intent, such 
as legislative history, or the reason and spirit of the law. See H.R.S. § 1-15(2) (1993). 
IV. ARGUMENT. 
A. The Answer to the Certified Question Has a Profound Impact on Federal 
Judgmentc;. 
By its own language, H.R.S. § 657-5 applies only to judgments entered in State 
Courts in Hawai'i. No federal court had ever held that a federal judgment on a federal cause of 
action was subject to sun setting under a state statute until the Ninth Circuit so ruled in In re 
Estate 0.( Ferdinand E. Marcos Human Rights Litig., 536 F Jd 980 (9th Cir. 2008). In that case, 
the class of 9,539 human rights victims with a judgment of almost $2 billion against the Estate of 
Ferdinand E. Marcos had obtained an order irOnl the district court extending their judgment 
another ten years pursuant to H.R.S. § 657-5.2 The order was entered more than 10 yeat·s after 
entry of final judgment in the consolidated cases, but less than ten years after affirmance of their 
judgment in the Ninth Circuit. See, Hi/ao v. Estate of Ferdinand E. Marcos, 103 F.3d 767 (9th 
Cir. 1996). The Ninth Circuit reasoned that since there was no case holding a federal judgment 
on a federal cause of action was not subject to a state sun setting law, state law must be 
applicable. It then construed the statute literally, stating: 
2 The request for the extension was precautionary since the class contended, inter alia, that 
federal judgnlents on federal causes of action did not sunset. 
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HRS § 657-5 provides that the limitations period begins to run on 
"the date the original judgment or decree was rendered." It does 
not say ten years trom the date of entry plus however much time it 
takes to appeal. 
The Ninth Circuit relied on this Court's decision in International Savings & Loan 
Ass 'n v. Wiig, 82 Hawai'i 197,921 P.2d 117 (Haw. 1996), when it concluded that the statute's 
tilne limits were absolute whether or not an appeal was filed. 
Appellants are informed that the class intends to file a petition for certiorari with 
the United .States Supreme Court to overtwn the Ninth Circuit ruling and has notified that Cou11 
of the pendency of the Ce11ified Question in this case. Unless the decision of the Ninth Circuit is 
reversed, it will have a profound impact on money judgments and decrees entered in the federal 
court in Hawai'i. Every federalilloney judgment and decree rendered on a federal cause of 
action more than 10 years ago is now unenforceable. This includes federal consent decrees in 
the areas of antitrust, securities, civil rights, schools, housing, the environment, mental health 
and prisoner rights. 
More specitically as it relates to the Certified Question, the Ninth Circuit's 
construction of when an appealedjudglnent is "rendered" pursuant to H.R.S. § 657-5 alters 
fundanlcntal notions of finality as to both state and federal law and is contrary to 1110st case law. 
In any event, it is this Court, not the Ninth Circuit, whose construction of H.R.S. § 657-5 is 
definitive. 
B. A Judgment is '"Rendered" When It Is Final After Appeal. 
A cardinal principle of both Hawai'i and federal law is that ajudglnent is not 
final and binding until the exhaustion of appeals or expiration of the period to appeal. Markel 
Street R. Co. v. Railroad Commission, 324 U.S. 548,551-52 (1945); FTC v. Minneapolis':'· 
Honeywell Regulator Co., 344 U.S. 206, 212 (1952): A federal judgment is not final until the 
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mandate is spread on the record in the district coUti. Bianchi v. Perry, 154 F.3d 1023 (9th Cir. 
1998). A state couli jUdgment is not final and binding until all appeals are final. Hoopai v. Civil 
Service Conul1ission, 106 Haw. 205, 103 P.3d 365 (2004); Solarana v. Industrial Electronics. 
Inc. 50 Haw. 22, 428 P.2d 411 (1967). 
Execution on ajudgment is subject to various restrictions and disabilities until the 
judgment is final and binding. Judgolent debtors regularly request stays of execution pending 
appeal and~ where the judgment require a turnover of real or personal property, stays are usually 
granted A federal judgment may not be transferred to another district under federal law until all 
appeals are exhausted or the time for appeal is expired. See 28 U.S.C. § 1963. A state court 
judgment may be transferred to another state for execution under the Uniform Act before appeals 
are final, but execution is automatically stayed if an appeal is pending. See H.R.S. § 636C-S. If 
execution on a Hawai'i judgment is permitted in Hawai'i pending appeal, the proceeds are 
subject to return to the judgment debtor if the judgment is reversed. The restrictions on 
execution pending appeal warrant this Court construing the tenn "rendered" as coextensive with 
final and binding after all appeals are concluded or the tinle for appeal has expired. Otherwise, 
the 10 year period of H.R.S. § 657-5 is artificially sholiened. With appeals to successive courts 
sometiInes taking years, judgment creditors are at a distinct disadvantage. 
This Court has never deternlined when an appealed judgment is "rendered" 
pursuant to H.R.S. § 657-5. The judgn1ent in Wiig, was not appealed. Nor was the judgment in 
Brooks v. Ivlinn, 836 P.2d 1081 (1992) appealed. However, Hawaii's intermediate appellate 
court has suggested that an appealed judgment is "rendered" only after all appeals are final. See 
Beecher LId v. Alvarez & Marsal North America, LLC, 187 P.3d 593 (Haw. App. 2008). 
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Over 100 years ago in Borer v. Chapman, 119 U.S. 587 (1887) th.e United States 
Suprclne Court held that a federal judglnent (based on diversity jurisdiction) is not "rendered'" 
for purposes of a state sun setting law until all appeals are final. The Court affirmed the obvious 
point that '"[ilt cannot be that the statute of limitations will be allowed to comnlence to run 
against a right until that right has accrued in a shape to be effectually enforced." Borer v. 
Chaplnan, 119 U.S. 587, 602 (1887). The key facts of the Borer case are siInilar to those of the 
pre~ent case. On April 19, 1872, a judgment was issued in favor of Chapman against Snow (in 
Snow's capacity as executor of John Gordon) for $7,264.25 plus costs, with interest to run from 
July 10, 1871. /d at 593-94. On August 20, 1879, Chapman sought to collect this judgment by 
filing an action against the administrator of Gordon's estate and his legatees. These defendants 
contended that the action filed by Chapman on August 20, 1879 to collect his jUdgment was 
barred by the statute of lhnitations because it "should have been filed within one year froin the 
date o( the final judginent in that action," which, according to their contentions, occurred on 
April 19, 1872 (or perhaps even earlier, on July 10, 1871). Id at 601. 
The Supreme Court rejected this argument, explaining that "the judglnent 
rendered April 19, 1872, was not the end of the litigation." Id at 602. Snow had appealed the 
verdict, and the matter was pursued for several years by Snow's executor after Snow's death. 
The judgment was reversed on technical grounds, Smith v. Chapman 93 U.S. 41 (1876) (because 
"'it was en-oneous in form," 119 U.S. at 593), "[t]he mandate of this cOUl1 was filed in the circuit 
court [on] June 7, 1877, and on December 18, 1878, the tinal judgment was entered against 
Snow as executor ... " Id. Chapman's filing on August 20, 1879 was thus valid because it "was 
filed within 12 Inonths after the date of that entry" referring to the entry of the final judgment on 
December 18, 1878, after all the appeals had been completed and the circuit court had issued a 
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new and technically-proper judgment. Id Snow~s executor argued that the effective date of the 
judgll1ent for purposes of the statute of limitations should be July 10, 1871, but the Supreme 
Court explained that "[t]he date of that entry is by a fiction of law" and that "the right of the 
complainant in this bill to enforce that judgment by the present proceeding certainly did not 
begin until after the judgment in that fonn was actually entered." Id Until that final judglnent 
was "actually entered''' on December] 8, 1878, "the right of the cOlnplainant ... to enforce that 
judgment" ~'was in abeyance" because "the litigation had, until then ended, been continuously in 
progress." Id. 
The view that state sun setting laws do not begin to run untj I the appeal process has 
been completed, or the time for filing an appeal has passed, is supported by numerous decisions. 
One of the recent opinions discussing this issue directly is Home Port Rentals, Inc. v. 
International Yachting Group, Inc., 252 F.3d 399 (5th Cir. 2001), where the Fifth Circuit 
characterized the argument that Louisiana's statute of Ii mi tati ons for enforcing a j udglnent 
would begin when the trial coul1 issued its judgment rather than at the time it was affirmed on 
appeal as "clearly specious." ld. at 406. It is hard to illlagine a word that rejects the Inerits of an 
argument more clearly than "specious." Its strong language on this issue makes it clear that a 
state sun setting statute cannot begin until the appeal process is completed and the lnandate has 
been issued by the appellate court. In Andrews v. Roadway Express Inc .. 473 F.3d 565 (51h Cir. 
2006) the Fi fth Circuit, construing a Texas sun setting statute, stated that "[t]he time-litnit for 
enforcenlent began to run when the Supreme Court denied review of the judgment. See John F 
Grant Lumber Co. v. Bell, 302 S.W.2d 714 (Tex.Civ.App.-EastIand 1957)." 
Other decisions that have reached this same conclusion include, e.g., Kertesz v. 
Ostrovs!cy, 8 Cal. Rptr. 3d 907, 910 (Cal. App. 2004) (explaining that a "statute of limitations for 
-8-
University Of Hawaii School of Law Library - Jon Van Dyke Archives Collection
an action on a jUdgment does not accrue until the judgment is final," and that a "judgment is not 
final until the time within which to the appeal the judgment has expired"); Turner v. Donovan, 
126 P .2d 187 (CaI.App. 1942) (explaining that an action based on a judgment cannot be brought 
"until the issues between the parties had been determined finally" pursuant to "its final 
determination upon appeal, or until the time for appeal has passed"); Ferris v. Independence 
Indent Co., 12 P.2d 148, 149 (CaI.App. 1932) ("Both appellant and respondents concede the 
general rule to be that a judgtnent does not become final until it has' been finally detemlined on 
appeal and that a right of action upon a jUdgment does not nlature until the judgolent becomes 
final. "); Anderson v. Shaffer, 277 Pac. 185 (Cal. App. 1 929) (the statute of limitations regarding 
actions to collect a judgment "would commence after the tit11e for appeal had elapsed, and the 
judgnlent attained finality"); Drummond v. Green, 35 Md. 148 (1872) (explaining that the statute 
of limitations began to run from the decision of the Court of Appeals, not from the decree of the 
inferior court).3 
C. The Anlendment of Appellants' Judgments Warrant a New Rendering 
Date 
It is clear that Piopongco and Sison were unable to execute on their original 
judgments until the amended judgments were final and binding in October 1997. Sison had no 
money judgnlent until the amended judgment was entered, and Piopongco's original judgment 
was only half of his runended judgment. Under these facts, a rendering date of 1995 makes no 
sense, as they were unable to execute on their ultitnate judgments. 
3 The jurisprudence in the criminal context is consistent with limitation periods commencing to 
run upon issuance of the mandate. See Clay v. United Slates, 123 S.Ct. 1072 (2003); Day v. 
lv/cDonollgh, 126 S.Ct. 1675 (2006); Johnson v. Kenna, 451 FJd 938 (81h eire 2006). 
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v. CONCLUSION. 
For all the foregoing reasons, this Court should answer the Certified Question by 
stating that under H.R.S. § 657-5 an appealed judgment is not rendered until all appeals are tinal 
or the time for appeal has expired. 
DATED: Honolulu, Hawai'i, December ~, 2008. 
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Plaintiff-Appellants ESTATE OF FRANCISCO SISON, JOSE, MARIA SISON, 
and JAIME PIOPONGO, through her undersigned attorney, hereby submit their opening brief in 
th is appeal. 
I. CONCISE STATEMENT OF THE CASE. 
Appellants are victims of jus cogens hun1an rights violations who received federal 
judgments against the Estate of Ferdinand E. Marcos in 1995. They contend that their judgments 
were not "rendered~' within the meaning ofH.R.S. § 657-5 until all appeals were final and their 
atnended judgn1ents were entered in the district court in 1997. Unless their judgn1ents are 
extended another 10 years -- as they have requested the federal court - the judg111ents will lapse 
and they will be unable to execute thereon. Appellants, therefore, request this Honorable Court 
to answer the Certified Question by stating that under H.R.S. § 657-5 an appealed judgment is 
not rendered until all appeals are final or the time for appeal has expired. 
At the conclusion of an historic trifurcated trial spanning 3 years, a federal jury in 
Hawai'i found the Estate of Ferdinand E. Marcos liable for massive human rights abuses, 
including torture, summary execution and disappearance, committed against Filipinos during the 
Marcos dictatorship in the Philippines. The district court possessed subject matter jurisdiction of 
the litigation pursuant to the Alien Tort Statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1350. Among the individual 
plaintiffs receiving compensatory damage awards were Jaime Piopongco ($175,000) and the 
Estate of Ferdinand Sison ($400,000). Piopongco's claim for loss of property was disallowed by 
the district court, and the claim of Jose Maria Sison for compensatory damages was denied by 
the district court for insufficient evidence. Following a defense motion for new trial or 
remittitur, judgments were entered for Piopongco and the Estate of Ferdinand Sison on August 
11, 1995 for $75,000 and $100,000 together with pro rata shares ofa $1.2 billion award for 
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exelnplary damages and permanent injunctive relief. Final judgment in all cases in the 
consolidated multi-district litigation was entered by the Clerk of Court on December 6, 1995 
pursuant to Rule 58 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See United States v. Indrelunas, 
411 U.S. 216 (l973). 
Piopongco appealed the denial of his clailn for loss of property to the Ninth 
Circuit Court of Appeals, and Sison appealed his denial of damages. The Ninth Circuit reversed 
the district cOUlt's rulings, Hi/ao v. Estate of Ferdinand Marcos, 103 F.3d 789 (9th Cir. 1996), 
which resulted in the entry of an amended final judgment for Piopongco and Sison on October 3., 
1997. Piopongco's total amended judgment is for $507,027.72. Sison's total amended judgment 
is for $882,027.72. 
On October 2, 2007 - one day short of 1 ° years after entry of the anlended judgment --
Piopongco., Sison and the Estate of Ferdinand Sison filed a motion in the district court to extend 
their judgments an additional 10 years pursuant to H.R.S. § 657-5 which provides in pertinent 
part: 
Unless an extension is granted, every judglnent and decree of any 
court of the State shall be presumed to be paid and discharged at 
the expiration of ten years after the judgment or decree was 
rendered. No action shall be commenced after the expiration of ten 
years from the date ajudgment or decree was rendered or 
extended. No extension of a judgment or decree shall be granted 
unless the extension is sought within ten years of the date the 
original judgnlent or decree was rendered. A court shall not extend 
any judgment or decree beyond twenty years from the date of the 
original judgment or decree. No extension shall be granted without 
notice and the filing of a non-hearing motion or a hearing lTIotion 
to extend the life of the judgment or decree. 
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The disttict court held a hearing on the motion on September 12, 2008.' For reasons articulated 
by the district court at the hearing, the court entered an order certifying a question to the Hawai'i 
Supreme Court on September 26, 2008. 
II. CONCISE STATEMENTS OF POINTS ON APPEAL. 
By Order entered October 16, 2008, this Court agreed to decide the following 
celtified question: 
With regard to the time period for executing a judgment in H.R.S. 
§ 657-5, does the time period begin after the appellate process is 
completed (because the appeal may provide relief in the form of 
damages not provided for in the original judgment and because the 
completion of the appellate process allows the judgment creditor to 
proceed without limitation to collect the judgment) , or, in the 
altelnative, given that an amended judgment establishes the 
relationship between judgment creditor and debtor, does an 
amendment or nlodification of the original judgment (including an 
amended judgment providing for additional relief) start the time 
period anew? 
Ill. STANDARDS OF REV lEW. 
Statutory interpretation is "a question of law reviewable de novo." State v. Levi, 
102 Hawai'i 282, 285, 75 P.3d 1173, 1176 (2003) (quoting State v. Arceo, 84 Hawai'i 1, 10, 928 
P.2d 843, 852 (1996»). This court's statutory construction is guided by established rules: 
First, the fundanlental starting point for statutory interpretation is 
the language of the statute itselt: Second, where the statutory 
language is plain and unambiguous, our sole duty is to give effect 
to its plain and obvious meaning. Third, implicit in the task of 
statutory construction is our foremost obligation to ascertain and 
give effect to the intention of the legislature, which is to be 
obtained primarily from the language contained in the statute 
itself. Fourth, when there is doubt, doubleness of meaning, or 
indistinctiveness or uncertainty of an expression used in a statute, 
an anlbiguity exists. 
I The delay is attributable to an appeal pending in the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals in the 
class case as to whether H.R.S. § 657-5 applied to a federal jUdgment on a federal cause of 
action. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals ruled that it did apply on July 31, 2008. 
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Peterson v. Hawaii Elec. Light Co.'. Inc., 85 Hawai'i 322, 327-28, 944 P.2d 1265, 1270-71 
(1997)(superseded on other grounds by H.R.S. § 269-15.5 (Supp.1999» (formatting, brackets, 
citations, and quotation marks omitted). 
In the event of ambiguity in a statute, "the meaning of the ambiguous words may 
be sought by examining the context, with which the ambiguous words, phrases, and sentences 
tnay be compared, in order to ascertain their true meaning." Id. (quoting H.R.S. § 1-15(1) 
(1993»). Moreover, the courts luay resort to extrinsic aids in determining legislative intent, such 
as legislative history, or the reason and spirit of the law. See H.R.S. § 1-15(2) (1993). 
IV. ARGUMENT. 
A. The Answer to the Certified Question Has a Profound Impact on Federal 
Judgmentc;. 
By its own language, H.R.S. § 657-5 applies only to judgments entered in State 
Courts in Hawai'i. No federal court had ever held that a federal judgment on a federal cause of 
action was subject to sun setting under a state statute until the Ninth Circuit so ruled in In re 
Estate 0.( Ferdinand E. Marcos Human Rights Litig., 536 F.3d 980 (9th Cir. 2008). In that case, 
the class of9,539 human rights victims with a judgment of almost $2 billion against the Estate of 
Ferdinand E. Marcos had obtained an order from the district court extending their judgment 
cu10ther ten years pursuant to H.R.S. § 657-5.2 The order was entered more than 10 years after 
entry of final judgluent in the consolidated cases, but less than ten years after affirmance of their 
judgment in the Ninth Circuit. See. HUao v. Estate of Ferdinand E. Marcos, 103 F.3d 767 (9th 
Cir. 1996). The Ninth Circuit reasoned that since there was no case holding a federal judgment 
on a federal cause of action was not subject to a state sun setting law, state law must be 
applicable. It then construed the statute literally, stating: 
2 The request for the extension was precautionary since the class contended, inter alia, that 
federal judgnlents on federal causes of action did not sunset. 
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HRS § 657-5 provides that the limitations period begins to run on 
"the date the original judgment or decree was rendered." It does 
not say ten years from the date of entry plus however much time it 
takes to appeal. 
The Ninth Circuit relied on this Court's decision in International Savings & Loan 
Ass On v. Wiig, 82 Hawai' i 197, 921 P .2d 117 (Haw. 1996), when it concluded that the statute's 
tilne limits were absolute whether or not an appeal was filed. 
Appellants are informed that the class intends to file a petition for certiorari with 
the United .States Supreme Court to overturn the Ninth Circuit ruling and has notified that Court 
of the pendency of the Celtified Question in this case. Unless the decision of the Ninth Circuit is 
reversed, it will have a profound impact on money judgments and decrees entered in the federal 
court in Hawai'i. Every federal nloney judgment and decree rendered on a federal cause of 
action more than 10 years ago is now unenforceable. This includes federal consent decrees in 
the areas of antitrust, securities, civil rights, schools, housing, the environment, mental health 
and prisoner rights. 
More specifically as it relates to the Certified Question, the Ninth Circuit's 
construction of when an appealed judgment is "rendered" pursuant to H.R.S. § 657-5 alters 
fundanlental notions of finality as to both state and federal law and is contrary to most case law. 
In any event, it is this Court, not the Ninth Circuit, whose construction ofH.R.S. § 657-5 is 
definitive. 
B. A Judgment is "Rendered" When It Is Final After Appeal. 
A cardinal principle of both Hawai'i and federal law is that a judgment is not 
final and binding until the exhaustion of appeals or expiration of the period to appeal.· ·Market 
Street R. Co. v. Railroad Commission, 324 U.S. 548, 551-52 (1945); FTC v. Minneapolis':" 
Honeywell Regulator Co., 344 U.S. 206, 212 (1952): A federal judgment is not final until the 
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mandate is spread on the record in the district couti. Bianchi v. Perry, 154 F.3d 1023 (9th Cir. 
1998). A state cou11 jUdgment is not final and binding until all appeals are final. Hoopai v. Civil 
Service Commission, 106 Haw. 205, 103 P.3d 365 (2004); Solarana v. Industrial Electronics. 
Inc. 50 Haw. 22,428 P.2d 411 (1967). 
Execution on ajudgment is subject to various restrictions and disabilities until the 
judgment is final and binding. Judgnlent debtors regularly request stays of execution pending 
appeal and., where the judgnlent require a turnover of real or personal property, stays are usually 
granted A federal judgment may not be transferred to another district under federal law until all 
appeals are exhausted or the time for appeal is expired. See 28 U.S.C. § 1963.- A state court 
judgment may be transferred to another state for execution under the Uniform Act before appeals 
are final, but execution is automatically stayed if an appeal is pending. See H.R.S. § 636C-5. If 
execution on a Hawai'i judgment is permitted in Hawai'i pending appeal, the proceeds are 
subject to return to the judgment debtor if the judgment is reversed. The restrictions on . 
execution pending appeal warrant this Court construing the tenn "rendered" as coextensive with 
final and binding after all appeals are concluded or the tinle for appeal has expired. Otherwise, 
the 10 year period ofH.R.S. § 657-5 is artificially shortened. With appeals to successive courts 
sometilnes taking years, judgment creditors are at a distinct disadvantage. 
This Court has never deternlined when an appealed judgnlent is "rendered" 
pursuant to H.R.S. § 657-5. The judgment in Wiig, was not appealed. Nor was the judglnent in 
Brooks v. lvlinn, 836 P.2d 1081 (1992) appealed. However, Hawaii's intermediate appellate 
court has suggested that an appealed judgment is '~rendered" only after all appeals are final. See 
Beecher LId v. Alvarez & Marsal North America, LLC,_ 187 P.3d 593 (Haw. App. 2008). 
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Over 100 years ago in Borer v. Chapman, 119 U.S. 587 (1887) th~ United States 
Suprclne Court held that a federal judglnent (based on diversity jurisdiction) is not "rendered'" 
tor purposes of a state sun setting law until all appeals are final. The Court affirmed the obvious 
point that '''[ilt cannot be that the statute of limitations will be allowed to comnlence to run 
against a right until that right has accrued in a shape to be effectually enforced." Borer v. 
Chapman, 119 U.S. 587, 602 (1887). The key facts of the Borer case are siInilar to those of the 
present case. On April 19, 1872, a judgment was issued in favor of Chapman against Snow (in 
Snow's capacity as executor of John Gordon) tor $7,264.25 plus costs, with interest to run from 
July 10, 1871. Jd at 593-94. On August 20, 1879, Chapman sought to collect this judgnlent by 
tiling an action against the administrator of Gordon's estate and his legatees. These defendants 
contended that the action filed by Chapman on August 20, 1879 to collect his judgment was 
barred by the statute of lilnitations because it "should have been filed within one year froln the 
date ot~ the final judglnent in that action," which, according to their contentions, occurred on 
April 19, 1872 (or perhaps even earlier, on July 10,1871). ld. at 601. 
The Supreme Court rejected this argument, explaining that "the judglnent 
rendered April 19, 1872, was not the end of the litigation." ld at 602. Snow had appealed the 
verdict, and the matter was pursued for several years by Snow's executor after Snow's death. 
The judgment was reversed on technical grounds, Smith v. Chapman 93 U.S. 41 (1876) (because 
"'it was en'oneous in form," 119 U.S. at 593), "[t]he mandate of this coul1 was tiled in the circuit 
coul1 [on] June 7, 1877, and on December 18, 1878, the tinal judgment was entered against 
Snow as executor ... " ld Chapman's filing on August 20, 1879 was thus valid because it "was 
filed within 12 nlonths after the date of that entry" referring to the entry of the final judgment on 
December 18, 1878, after all the appeals had been completed and the circuit court had issued a 
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new and technically-proper judgment. Id Snow~s executor argued that the effective date of the 
judgl11ent for purposes of the statute of limitations should be July 10, 1871, but the Supreme 
Court explained that "[t]he date of that entry is by a fiction of law" and that "the right of the 
complainant in this bill to entorce that judgment by the present proceeding certainly did not 
begin until after the judgment in that fonn was actually entered." Id. Until that final judgment 
was "actually entered" on December 18, 1878, "the right of the cOlnplainant ... to enforce that 
judgment" ~'was in abeyance" because "the litigation had, until then ended, been continuously in 
progress." Id. 
The view that state sun setting laws do not begin to run until the appeal process has 
been completed, or the time for filing an appeal has passed, is sUPPolied by numerous decisions. 
One of the recent opinions discussing this issue directly is Home Port Rentals, Inc. v. 
International Yachting Group, Inc., 252 F.3d 399 (5th Cir. 2001), where the Fifth Circuit 
characterized the argument that Louisiana's statute of limitations for enforcing a judglnent 
would begin when the trial court issued its judgment rather than at the time it was affinned on 
appeal as "clearly specious." Id at 406. It is hard to iOlagine a word that rejects the merits of an 
argument lnore clearly than "specious." Its strong language on this issue Inakes it clear that a 
state sun setting statute cannot begin until the appeal process is completed and the Inandate has 
been issued by the appellate court. In Andrews v. Roadway Express Inc .. 473 F.3d 565 (5th eire 
2006) the Fifth Circuit, construing a Texas sun setting statute, stated that "[t]he tilne-litnit for 
ellforcenlent began to run when the Supreme Court denied review of the judgment. See John F 
Granl Lumber Co. v. Bell, 302 S.W.2d 714 (Tex.Civ.App.-Eastland 1957)." 
Other decisions that have reached this same conclusion include, e.g., Kertesz v. 
Ostrovsky, 8 Cal. Rptr. 3d 907, 910 (Cal. App. 2004) (explaining that a "statute of limitations for 
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an action on a judgment does not accrue until the judgment is final," and that a "judgment is not 
final until the time within which to the appeal the judgment has expired"); Turner v. Donovan, 
126 P .2d 187 (Cal.App. 1942) (explaining that an action based on a judgment cannot be brought 
"until the issues between the parties had been determined finally" pursuant to "its final 
detelmination upon appeal, or until the time for appeal has passed"); Ferris v. Independence 
Indent Co., 12 P.2d 148, 149 (Cal.App. 1932) ("Both appellant and respondents concede the 
general rule to be that a judgment does not become final until it has been finally deternlined on 
appeal and that a right of action upon a jUdgment does not nlature until the judgnlent beconles 
final. "); Anderson v. Shaffer, 277 Pac. 185 (Cal.App.1929) (the statute of linlitations regarding 
actions to collect a judgment "would commence after the thne for appeal had elapsed, and the 
judgnlent attained finality"); Drummond v. Green, 35 Md. 148 (1872) (explaining that the statute 
of limitations began to run from the decision of the Court of Appeals, not from the decree of the 
inferior court}.3 
C. The Amendment of Appellants' Judgments Warrant a New Rendering 
Date 
It is clear that Piopongco and Sison were unable to execute on their original 
judgments until the anlended judgments were final and binding in October 1997. Sison had no 
money judgnlent until the amended judgment was entered, and Piopongco's original judgment 
was only half of his runended judgment. Under these facts, a rendering date of 1995 makes no 
sense, as they were unable to execute on their ultimate judgments. 
3 The jurisprudence in the criminal context is consistent with limitation periods commencing to 
run upon issuance of the mandate. See Clay v. United States, 123 S.Ct. 1072 (2003); Day v. 
Jv!cDonough, 126 S.Ct. 1675 (2006);.Johnson v. Kenna, 451 FJd 938 (8th Cir. 2006). 
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v. CONCLUSION. 
For all the foregoing reasons, this Court should answer the Certified Question by 
stating that under H.R.S. § 657-5 an appealed judgment is not rendered until all appeals are final 
or the time for appeal has expired. 
DATED: Honolulu, Hawai'i, December ~, 2008. 
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STATEMENT OF NO RELATED CASES 
Pursuant to Rule 28, Haw. R. App. Pro., Plaintiff-Appellants state that there are 
no related cases known to be pending before Hawai'i courts or agencies arising out of or 
involving the saIne parties or issues to this case. 
DATED: Honolulu, Hawai'i, December 5, 2008. 
Attorney for Plain 'ff-Appel nts' 
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